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The recent plight of the United States as an international
trading nation is well documented.' The nation's trade deficit
has grown dramatically over the past several years, reaching a
record $117.7 billion during 1985.2 The United States has, in
fact, become one of the largest debtor nations in the world. The
reasons are complex and sometimes controversial. The strength
of the dollar and the strong American economic recovery relative
to our trading partners are immediate and obvious contributing
factors to the American trade imbalance.4 The strength of the
dollar, however, does not account fully for the deficit, as rapid
depreciation of the dollar would have adverse consequences.5
"A depreciation of the dollar means a loss in purchasing power
for the American consumer, which means a lower standard of liv-
ing for us all."
6
Other factors that contribute to the American trade dilemma
include: (1) foreign trade barriers;7 (2) diminished growth of
American productivity; 8 and (3) excessive antitrust enforcement. 9
Only governments can deal comprehensively with national tariff
* George E. Garvey is Professor of Law at the Columbus School of Law of The
Catholic University of America.
I See, e.g., 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL COMPETrrIvENESs, GLOBAL
COMPETON: THE NEW REALIT, (1985) [hereinafter cited as GLOBAL COMPETITION];
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT ON U.S. COMPETITIVENESS TOGETHER WirH THE STUDY ON U.S. COMPETITIVENESS
(1980) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT].
2 Auerbach, Trade Gap Hits Record, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1986, at G1, col. 6.
3 Id
4 Johnson & Szarek, Effects of Strong Dollar, Economic Recovery Apparent in First-Half
Import and Export Prices, 107 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3-4 (Oct. 1984).
5 GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 14.
6 Ia
7 SeeJ.JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 440-43
(1977).
8 GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 11.
9 M. DAWSON, LESSONS FROM THE PAST: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NATIONAL Ex-
PORT EXPANSION PROGRAMS 1963-1980, at 3 (undated study published by the Landegger
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and nontariff trade barriers. International governmental organi-
zations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), for example, are committed to an overall reduction in
barriers through periodic multinational negotiations. 10 Private
enterprise, on the other hand, is generally ill-equipped to affect
national trade policies directly. Indeed, firms that have had suffi-
cient economic strength with which to influence foreign national
policies have found themselves condemned for corruption both
at home and abroad. 1
The waning of American productivity is difficult both to ex-
plain and remedy.' 2 The reasons for this decline vary from in-
dustry to industry. The U.S. steel industry, for example, largely
failed to modernize production facilities, incurred excessive labor
costs, and pursued pricing policies that induced greater foreign
competition.' 3  Other industries suffer under conditions over
which they have little or no control, such as relatively high U.S.
capital costs' 4 and exchange rates that favor foreign producers.' 5
In addition, there may be substantial diversity among the produ-
cers within any particular industry, and, consequently, firms are
likely to function at different levels of efficiency.
Only the government can bring about economy-wide changes
intended to enhance productivity. The current debate over "in-
dustrial policy" is evidence that American law and policy makers
are acutely aware of the problem.' 6 A remedial consensus, how-
Program in Int'l Bus. Diplomacy at Georgetown Univ. School of Foreign Service);
GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 42-43.
10 A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE VI 21-7 (1979).
11 S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1977).
12 See The Productivity Growth Slowdown, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 314 (1981).
13 "Corporate Initiative:" Oversight Hearings on Corporate Initiative Before the Subcomm. on
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
35-39 (1981) (statement of F.M. Scherer).
14 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A HISTORICAL COMPARISON OF THE COST OF FINANCIAL
CAPITAL IN FRANCE, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES
(1983); GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 26-27.
15 GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 18, chart 7. The Report of the President's
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness is remarkable for its candid recognition that
there are areas of comparative disadvantage that the United States should accept. High
wages and an unfavorable exchange rate, for example, within reason increase the stan-
dard of living for Americans. The Commission, therefore, believes that the United
States should focus on improving its relative advantages in those areas where it tradi-
tionally has been strong. Id. at 6-7, 18.
16 See, e.g., Berry, Leading Economists Dispute the Case for an "Industrial Policy," Wash.
Post, Sept. 4, 1983, at G1, col. 1; Behr, Schultze Attacks Premise of New Industrial Policy,
Wash. Post., Sept. 29, 1983, at B1, col. 1; Pine, Debate Heats Up Again on Industrial Policy,
Wall St.J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 1, col. 5; Malmgren, Notesfor a U.S. Industrial Policy, CHAL-
Transnational Joint Ventures and Antitrust Analysis
ever, has been elusive. Views about the propriety, extent and na-
ture of government intervention are diverse.17 The government
arguably may affect productivity by changing monetary, fiscal,
tax, or trade policies, alone or in some combination. A compre-
hensive analysis of industrial policy is beyond the scope of this
article, although, in the author's judgment, a sound policy should
rely largely on markets to achieve productive and allocative effi-
ciency and use government resources to increase understanding
of the likely impact of legal and political policy decisions on
productivity.
The antitrust laws have frequently been identified as a need-
less barrier to beneficial international competitive activities.' 8
Sparse evidence exists, however, that antitrust has actually im-
paired healthy international competition.' 9 Moreover, recent
legislation-Title IV of the Export Trading Company Act of
1982 2 -- eliminated even the perception that antitrust poses a
barrier to concerted export activities not having a direct, substan-
tial, and reasonably foreseeable anticompetitive effect on domes-
tic commerce or competitors. 2' One should not, therefore,
exaggerate the role that antitrust enforcement and policy play in
international trade. Particularly in light of the current emphasis
on efficiency in antitrust enforcement, proposed changes in the
law seem to be gimmicks22 that either promise unrealistically to
simplify international trade or foster the goals of those seeking to
LENGE, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 19; Reindustrialization: Politics and Economics, CHA=LLNGE,
Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 39 (interview with Adlai E. Stevenson).
17 See Berry, supra note 16.
18 See Dawson, supra note 9, at 3.
19 Garvey, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1, 4-5 (1982); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON EXPORT
PROMOTION FUNCTIONS AND POTENTIAL EXPORT DISINCENTIVES 1-9 (1980); Ongman, Is
Somebody Crying "Wolf'?: An Assessment of Whether Antitrust Impedes Export Trade, 1 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 163, 218 (1979).
20 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982).
21 Id Title IV, which was designated "Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements," was
intended to eliminate needless uncertainty regarding the reach of U.S. antitrust laws to
joint export activities. H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1982).
22 In 1980, for example, the Wall StreetJournal editorialized about a then-pending
bill, S. 2718, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), as follows:
At best the Stevenson bill is mere gimmickry. It is being marketed under
the false pretense that it will help encourage the development of American
trading companies comparable to Mitsubishi, Mitsui, C. Itoh and the other
companies that have been so effective in selling Japanese wares around the
world. Since Japanese banks often have ownership positions in their country's
trading companies, the Stevenson bill's proponents argue that investments by
American banks will help this country develop similar institutions. And since
Japan and most Western European countries exempt exporting from domestic
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form cartels in international markets. 23 In fact, altering antitrust
policy will have limited impact on the volume of overall trade,
and will have a negative impact to the extent that firms are al-
lowed to establish and exploit monopolies.
One modest change in (or clarification of) antitrust policy,
however, may have salutary effects on international trade. Trans-
national joint ventures that enhance productivity, whether
through additional production or better facilities or distribution,
should enjoy a strong presumption of validity. The costs of
transacting international business, including the cost of risk-
bearing, are difficult to identify and calculate, while the benefits
of increased productivity are tangible. Moreover, the anticipated
harm to competition that results from such ventures is often
speculative and based on theories that may not fully account for
the complexity of international business organization.
24
This article develops the argument for lenient treatment of
transnationaljoint ventures in several sections. The first section
defines ajoint venture. The second and third summarize the his-
torical application of the antitrust laws to joint ventures in gen-
eral, and to transnationaljoint ventures in particular. The fourth
section explores the economic bases for analysis and briefly notes
some relevant political considerations. The fifth section analyzes
the application of antitrust principles to transnational ventures,
emphasizing the leading historic and contemporary judicial deci-
sions, and attempting to identify and critique the developing ana-
lytical approaches. Finally, the article suggests a judicial and
antitrust laws, the bill's advocates argue that American trading firms need a
similar dispensation.
All of which is so much hokum. The success ofJapanese trading compa-
nies lies not in their ownership structures or their antitrust freedoms, but in
their detailed knowledge of production sources and market opportunities
around the world, as well as their logistical skills in carrying through compli-
cated international transactions. Nothing stops American firms from offering
similar services, and indeed many already do. And there are hundreds of for-
eign sales agents, manufacturers' representatives and so on to serve the export
needs of American industrialists.
But the Stevenson bill does pose some dangers. By endorsing and ex-
panding the principle of export cartels, it undermines the U.S. commitment to
an open international trading system. How can we complain about OPEC or
Third World cartels if we encourage our sulphur or carbon black producers to
form their own export cartels?
Export Gimmickry, Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1980, at 26, col. 1.
23 See Rahl, International Cartels and Their Regulation, in INTERNATIONAL BuSINESS:
LAW AND POuCY OF RESTRc'rIV PRACTICEs 240-268 (0. Schacter & R. Hellawell eds.
1981).
24 See, e.g., infra notes 197-219 and accompanying text.
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legislative response that would conform antitrust analysis to the
realities of international commerce that make joint ventures an
appropriate, and often essential organizational structure for
transnational business.
I. DEFINING A JOINT VENTURE
The joint venture has been an antitrust will-o'-the-wisp, an
amorphous business entity devoid of prescribed form or content.
Professor Areeda has called it "an expansive notion without defi-
nite meaning or antitrust consequence. ' 25 Areeda is correct in
asserting that the term has historically lacked the precision of an
antitrust term of art. Sporadic antitrust decisions, however, im-
plicitly recognize, in their determinations regarding either liabil-
ity or remedies, the value of specific cooperative organizational
structures. 26 Moreover, in recent years the courts have often
characterized a relationship as a joint venture to signal, or per-
haps justify, a sympathetic analysis.27 The characterization has
therefore assumed greater antitrust significance than its vague
analytical content might suggest.
Professor Brodley suggests a functional definition of joint
venture that is shaped to fit antitrust analysis. 28 In Brodley's
view, a joint venture should: (1) be controlled jointly by the par-
ents; (2) have received substantial contributions from the par-
ents; (3) be an entity separate from its parents; and (4) create
"significant new enterprise capability."' 29 Other entities would,
for antitrust purposes, be treated as something other than joint
ventures. The definition is somewhat arbitrary, since it excludes
business organizations properly identified for other purposes as
joint ventures. It is useful, however, because it identifies the
characteristics ofjoint enterprise that both require and help with-
stand serious antitrust scrutiny: they may facilitate collusion, but
they may also foster efficiency. Joint ventures, therefore, merit
neither unreasoned approval nor unreasoned condemnation-
the sorts of results that flow from an analysis based on the gener-
alizations of a per se rule.
25 p. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 471 (3d ed. 1981).
26 See infra notes 56-66, 79-105 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 23
(1979); cf. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 302 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
28 Brodley,Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1524-27 (1982).
29 Id. at 1526.
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As the term is used in this article, a "joint venture" possesses
the characteristics identified by Professor Brodley. Primarily, the
joint venture is an entity separate from its parents which creates
"significant new enterprise capability. ' 3 0 In addition, a transna-
tional venture must have at least one American and one foreign
venturer. One should adjust the requirements that the parents
jointly control and make substantial contributions to the venture,
however, based upon the exigencies of international transactions.
Finally, national trade policies may shape both the ability of the
parents to exercise control over the venture, and the nature and
amount of contributions to it.
31
II. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO JOINT VENTURES
Joint ventures, like other business entities, are subject to scru-
tiny under the Sherman Act,32 the Clayton Act, 3 and section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.34 Section 2 of the Sherman
Act proscribes monopolization and attempts or combinations to
monopolize. 35 A venture that impropierly achieves or exercises
monopoly power violates section 2.36 Section 1 of the Sherman
Act forbids contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unrea-
30 A cooperative venture that eliminates or reduces productive or distributive ca-
pacity, in contrast, is engaging in classic cartel behavior, and a different standard from
the one proposed here should apply. Unfortunately, the primary antitrust exemption
intended to promote export trade, the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. § 61-66 (1982),
has tended to promote price-fixing (i.e., production limiting) ventures. I NAT'L COMM'N
FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 296-97 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L COMM'N].
31 See, e.g., Radway, Antitrust, Technology Transfers and Joint Ventures in Latin American
Development, 15 LAW. AM. 47 (1983).
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
33 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982).
34 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). Export ventures are also covered by the Webb-Pomerene
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1980), and Title III of the Export Trading Company Act of
1982, 15 U.S.C. § 4017 (1982). Ventures affecting import trade are also subject to the
prohibitions of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. 8 (1982), and possibly § 1337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982). The primary focus of this article, however,
is on the structural aspects of joint ventures, and it does not generally consider the
potential application of these various statutes to the ventures' activities.
35 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
36 The courts have consistently held that monopoly itself is not prohibited. See, e.g.,
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-62 (1911); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter cited as Alcoa]. Over time,
the courts have failed to articulate clearly or apply uniformly the factors that convert an
otherwise legal monopoly into an illegal monopoly under the Sherman Act. Compare,
Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58-62, with United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106-07
(1948) and United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 338-46 (D.
Mass. 1953), a~fdper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). A specific intent to monopolize also
violates the Act, when coupled with a great likelihood of success. Swift and Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 134 (1977).
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sonably restrain the interstate or foreign commerce of the United
States. 7 Violation of either section 1 or section 2 is a felony sub-
ject to imprisonment and fine. 8 Private parties injured by a vio-
lation may also sue for treble damages in addition to the costs of
the suit.39
Section 7 of the Clayton Act40 prohibits mergers or acquisi-
tions, including the creation of jointly owned ventures,41 that
may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in any product line in any region of the United States. Sec-
tion 7 is more problematic for prospective ventures than sections
1 or 2 of the Sherman Act because it reaches conduct that has not
yet had anticompetitive effects.4 2
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits
"unfair methods of competition. '43  This provision generally
reaches activities that violate either the Sherman or Clayton Act,
as well as similar conduct that has not yet violated these other
laws.44 Although section 5 is applicable to international joint
ventures,45 this article will not discuss it independently. The
reader, however, should be aware that activities that violate the
Sherman Act or the Clayton Act may also violate section 5 of the
FTC Act.
A. The Sherman Act
The antitrust laws have traditionally distinguished between the
internal operations of a firm and the external relationships be-
tween firms.46 A firm is generally free to make independent deci-
37 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The "reasonable" element is the product ofjudicial gloss.
See, e.g., Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60.
38 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
39 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
40 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
41 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 167-68 (1964).
42 United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 505 (1974); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
43 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
44 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972); FTC v. Brown
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966).
45 B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A
CoMPARATIvE GUIDE 278 (1982).
46 The Supreme Court has recently articulated the reason for the legal distinction
between internal operations and external coordination:
The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly than unilat-
eral behavior is readily appreciated. Concerted activity inherently is fraught
with anticompetitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the independent cen-
ters of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In any conspir-
acy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately
337
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sions about price and output, unless it improperly achieves and
exercises substantial monopoly power. One firm acting alone
cannot violate section 1 of the Sherman-Act.47 When two or
more independent firms agree to engage in activities that will af-
fect prices, production, or distribution, however, they are subject
to antitrust scrutiny and may face outright condemnation.
48 If
they are competitors, the reasonableness of their alliance, their
market power, and the actual effect of their actions are often con-
sidered irrelevant.
49
Judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act refuse, by and
large, to recognize value in organizational structures other than
total integration of a firm.50 The courts have been insensitive to
the potential value of partial integration.5 1 Antitrust law has thus
treated joint ventures as contracts, combinations, or conspiracies
subject to the same per se rules that apply to cartels. The
Supreme Court, for example, stated in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States52 that it found no "support in reason or authority for
the proposition that agreements between legally separate per-
sons and companies to suppress competition among themselves
and others can be justified by labeling the project a 'joint
venture.' "I'
1. The Rule of Reason Era
When the rule of reason held full sway in antitrust analysis,
54
the distinction between joint ventures and other forms of combi-
are combining to act as one for their common benefit. This not only reduces
the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases
the economic power moving in one particular direction. Of course, such merg-
ings of resources may well lead to efficiencies that benefit consumers, but their
anticompetitive potential is sufficient to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of
incipient monopoly.
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2741 (1984).
47 P. AREEDA, supra note 25, at 350.
48 See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
49 See Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224 n.59.
50 Much of the law regarding the "contract, combination . . or conspiracy" ele-
ment of section 1 has developed in the context of "intra-enterprise" activities. Until
very recently, separate legal entities were treated as capable of conspiring regardless of
the actual economic relationships between them. The Copperweld decision, however, has
moderated this doctrine somewhat. Under Coapperweld, a parent cannot violate the law by
"conspiring" with its wholly-owned subsidiary. 104 S. Ct. at 2742.
51 But see Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2743.
52 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
53 Id. at 598.
54 From the Supreme Court's decision in Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1, until Socony-Vac-
uum, 310 U.S. 150, the Court demonstrated a strong commitment to the rule of reason.
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nation was insignificant. A court had to consider all of the cir-
cumstances surrounding a restraint to determine if it was, on
balance, reasonable. Justice Brandeis's classic articulation of the
rule of reason noted that the proper test is "whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby pro-
motes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition." 55
The flexibility of the rule of reason and its focus on actual
competitive impact permitted courts to uphold ventures that en-
hanced competition. Early antitrust decisions such as United
States v. Terminal Railroad Association,56 Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States57 and Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States58 recog-
nized the potential value of cooperative ventures. In the Terminal
Railroad case, for example, fourteen railroads formed an associa-
tion to acquire the three previously independent terminal opera-
tors in St. Louis. Although the topography of St. Louis made it
impractical for other railroads to build their own terminal facili-
ties, the Association excluded or discriminated against nonmem-
ber competitors. Under these circumstances, the Court found
that the combination violated the Sherman Act. The decision,
however, implicitly recognized the economic value of the ven-
ture. The Court noted that the existence of several independent
terminal operators "resulted in some cases in an unnecessary du-
plication of facilities."59 Moreover, despite the violation, the
Court did not dissolve the Association. Rather, it required the
Association to admit new members and to provide its services to
nonmembers on a nondiscriminatory basis.60 Finally, the Court
stressed that this cooperative venture would have posed no prob-
lem if it had been physically practical to build alternative terminal
facilities.6'
The Chicago Board of Trade case upheld the Board's "call rule,"
a price restraint imposed by the Board on its members.62 During
the hours the Board was closed, its members could purchase
grain being shipped to Chicago only at the last quoted price. Jus-
tice Brandeis' majority opinion identified the benefits of the rule,
55 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
56 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
57 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
58 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
59 Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. at 393.
60 Id. at 411.
61 Id. at 405.
62 Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. 231.
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which included the maintenance of a public market and the re-
duction of risk for buyers and sellers, and the Court held that the
restraint was reasonable.63
Finally, in Appalachian Coals the Supreme Court found that the
creation of a common sales agency by 137 coal producers did not
violate the Act.64 The Court viewed the common agent as a rea-
sonable response to the distressed conditions facing the coal in-
dustry. Also, the agency did not achieve monopoly power.65 By
channeling sales through a single agent, the coal producers were
able to limit excessive production (mining a particular type of
coal to fill a specific order invariably produced other types for
which there might be no demand) and eliminate the unrealistic,
apparent supply curve created by numerous sales agents compet-
ing to sell the same coal.66
These early decisions share some significant characteristics.
For one thing, the fact that a combination exercised power over
price was not controlling. It was only one factor weighed against
the competing beneficial effects of the ventures. Most signifi-
candy, the Court in each of these cases appreciated the potential
efficiency gains that limited integration through a cooperative
venture could achieve.
2. The Per Se Era
The ascendancy of per se rules created a serious problem for
joint ventures. Beginning with United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co. 
67
in 1940 and extending through the mid-1970s, the Supreme
Court adopted near-conclusive presumptions that certain types
of conduct were anticompetitive. Price-fixing, 68 market alloca-
tion,6 9 tying agreements 70 and boycotts71 were either condemned
63 Id. at 240-41.
64 Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. 344.
65 See id. at 375.
66 Id. at 363. The practice of selling through numerous agents, known as pyramid-
ing, created the impression that the supply of coal greatly exceeded the amounts actually
available. This exacerbated the problems caused by the excessive amount of coal that
was in fact in the market. Id.
67 310 U.S. 150. Socony-Vacuum is the strongest modem articulation of the per se
rule, but it should be noted that there were earlier hints at a per se approach in the
context of price-fixing. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392
(1927); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, af'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
68 See Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150; Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392; Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271.
69 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
70 N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
71 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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outright or the available defenses in support of their use were
severely limited. Judicial economy and legal certainty out-
weighed, in the Court's view, any lost efficiency. 2
As courts focused on conduct, and generalized about eco-
nomic consequences, they de-emphasized the relationships be-
tween the parties. The law condemned joint activity falling
within a per se rule, regardless of the relationship between the
parties. Justice Douglas articulated the extreme position:
What may not be done by two companies who decide to
divide a market surely cannot be done by the convenient
creation of a legal umbrella-whether joint venture or
common ownership and control. . . .under which they
achieve the same objective by moving in unison.7 3
Socony-Vacuum, the origin of the modem per se rules, repre-
sented a significant shift from the earlier sympathetic approach to
efficiency-enhancing cooperative conduct. Under circumstances
remarkably similar to those in Appalachian Coals, the Court disre-
garded the plight of the industry and the claimed benefits of the
agreement at issue.74 Any tampering with price structures, it
held, is "beyond the pale."
75
Two other cases from this era exemplify the Court's disregard
for the potential benefits of joint ventures. In United States v.
Topco Associates76 the Court condemned an association of in-
dependent grocery stores for allocating exclusive sales territories
among members selling Topco brand products. Topco argued
that its members could not adequately promote the Topco brand
unless they were protected against competition from other
Topco sellers. Protecting its members against intra-brand com-
petition, the Association argued, enhanced their ability to com-
pete with national chains. The District Court agreed with Topco
72 See Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 609-10.
73 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem: Co., 378 U.S. 158, 181 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
74 Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150. The defendant oil refiners in Socony-Vacuum faced a
market glutted with gasoline, some produced illegally. Crude oil producers were unwill-
ing to stop pumping oil since it was difficult to recapture a capped well and smaller
refiners were unable to store their output. In some places, gasoline was selling below
the costs of production. Consequently, the defendants, large refiners, agreed to
purchase and store the excess gasoline. Neither the distressed state of the industry, the
fact that prices were still determined by market forces (less the excess gasoline), nor
existing government policies fostering the reduction in available gasoline could justify
the scheme.
75 Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 221.
76 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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and ruled in its favor. The Supreme Court reversed, however,
holding that market allocations are illegal per se:
Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, de-
struction of competition in one sector of the economy
against promotion of competition in another sector is one
important reason we have formulated per se rules.
In applying these rigid rules, the Court has consistently
rejected the notion that naked restraints of trade are to be
tolerated because they are well intended or because they
are allegedly developed to increase competition.
77
Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC7s reached a similar
result. The Fashion Originators' Guild of America (FOGA) was
an association of fashion designers created in part to deal with
the problem of fashion piracy-copying designs for sale in com-
petition with the originals. Among other things, FOGA estab-
lished a mechanism to detect and boycott retailers selling copied
garments. The FTC refused to admit much of the evidence of-
fered by FOGA to establish that the practices were beneficial to
producers, workers, sellers and buyers of original fashions. A
concerted refusal to deal could not be justified, so the Supreme
Court affirmed.
There were exceptional cases during this period. In United
States v. Morgan, 79 for example, the government challenged a syn-
dication of investment bankers. The district court, stressing that
investment banking syndication is sui generis, upheld the ven-
ture. 0 Syndication brought into existence a unique entity geared
to "shap[e] up the issue, underwrit[e] the risk and pla[n] and
carr[y] out the distribution.""' The court did not treat the partic-
ipating investment bankers as competitors.
Associated Press v. United States8 2 represented another exception
to the rigid per se approach to antitrust analysis. Associated
Press (AP) provided a world-wide news gathering service to
member newspapers. AP was the world's largest news service,
and its bylaws prohibited AP or any of its members from provid-
77 Id. at 609-10 (citations omitted).
78 312 U.S. 457 (1941). The Fashion Originators Guild case was decided under sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. It drew analogies, however, to Sherman
Act cases, and the Supreme Court subsequently cited Fashion Originators Guild as author-
ity for a rigid Sherman Act per se rule against boycotts. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
79 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
80 Id. at 689.
81 Id. at 690.
82 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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ing news to nonmembers. The bylaws also granted member
newspapers an effective veto over the admission of competing
papers. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's finding
that the use of this collective power to exclude competitors vio-
lated the Sherman Act. However, in spite of a finding that the
exclusion of newspapers from AP put these papers at a competi-
tive disadvantage,83 the Court allowed AP to adopt new bylaws
that could exclude new members for noncompetitive reasons.
84
The Morgan and Associated Press cases demonstrate that anti-
trust analysis has never fully rejected the potential benefits attain-
able through cooperative ventures. These decisions implicitly
recognized that individual firms cannot support some desirable
conduct, such as financing corporate expansion or gathering and
disseminating news, or will not support this conduct if their com-
petitors can readily appropriate its products without compensa-
tion.8 5 On the whole, however, antitrust analysis was hostile to
combinations of actual or potential competitors and insensitive
to purported competitive gains during this era of per se
analysis. 6
3. The Modern Era
In more recent years, the Supreme Court has demonstrated
increased awareness of efficiency which is possible through lim-
ited integration. The term "joint venture" has acquired antitrust
significance. Characterization of an agreement as a joint venture
today removes it from per se analysis; its validity is once again
judged by the rule of reason. 7
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System88 dramati-
cally illustrates the shift in the judicial attitude toward coopera-
tive ventures. Defendants BMI and ASCAP are comprised of
83 Id at 13-14.
84 Id. at 21.
85 Members of the Supreme Court have long recognized the problem of the free
rider. Cf. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 237-41 (1918) (finding it
unlawful for one news service to appropriate, for profit, the product of another's labor).
It has taken on increased significance, however, in recent years. See, e.g., Continental T.
V. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc.,
527 F. Supp 758 (D. Del. 1981).
86 See, e.g, Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 606-11 (finding that sales restraints imposed
upon members of a cooperative association of supermarkets were per se violations of the
Sherman Act).
87 Brodley, supra note 28, at 1535; E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENK P, ANTITRUST LAW
POLICY AND PROCEDURE 235 (1984). See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263, 302 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
88 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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thousands of composers, authors and publishers.8 9 They license
and enforce the copyrights of their members, primarily through
"blanket licenses" that authorize the licensee to use any copy-
righted composition of any member for a set fee.90 The fees are
generally unrelated to the volume of use of the copyrighted
materials. 9 ' CBS alleged that the blanket license amounted to
price-fixing between the societies' members. The district court
dismissed the complaint after trial, but the court of appeals re-
versed, holding that the conduct was price fixing and, therefore,
illegal per se.92 The Supreme Court reversed, stating that, "[t]o
the Court of Appeals and CBS, the blanket license involves 'price
fixing' in the literal sense: the composers and publishing houses
have joined together into an organization that sets its price for
the blanket license it sells. . . . Literalness is overly simplistic
and often overbroad."9 3 The Court identified several character-
istics that required analysis under the rule of reason. The costs
of individual transactions and enforcement called for a "middle-
man with a blanket license."94  Moreover, the combination
achieved a synergistic effect; the blanket license was a "different
product" from the sum of individual licenses.9 5
The most striking aspect of recent developments is judicial
recognition that the way a venture is organized, as well as the
conduct in which it engages, can have competitive significance.
As already noted, the Court allowed some joint endeavors even
during the period when it applied rigid per se rules.96 Those
cases tended to focus, however, on the unique characteristics of
the particular industry (e.g., sports97 or investment banking98 ) or
on the extraordinary economic problems facing the parties to the
venture.99 Even the Broadcast Music decision noted that copyright
licensing was sui generis.100 There is a perceptible tendency, how-
ever, to find value in certain ventures because they are efficient.
89 Id at 4-5. ASCAP is the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers.
90 Id. at 5.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 6.
93 Id. at 8-9 (footnote omitted).
94 Id. at 20.
95 Id at 21-22.
96 See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
97 See, NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2961 & n.24 (1984).
98 United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
99 Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. 344.
100 Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 10 (quoting opinion below, 562 F.2d at 132).
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Broadcast Music, for example, stated that "U]oint ventures and
other cooperative arrangements are also not usually unlaw-
ful. . . where the agreement on price is necessary to market the
product at all."'' Several years after Broadcast Music, the Court
found in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society '0 2 that two
foundations of medical doctors violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act by setting maximum fees. The Court again implicitly recog-
nized that certain cooperative ventures are desirable. Distin-
guishing the illegal combination of doctors from cooperative
activities that are legal and desirable, the Court stated:
The foundations are not analogous to partnerships or
other joint arrangements in which persons who would
otherwise be competitors pool their capital and share the
risks of loss as well as the opportunities for profit. In such
joint ventures, the partnership is regarded as a single firm
competing with other sellers in the market.'0 3
Finally, the Supreme Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents '0 4 con-
firmed its commitment to an analysis that focuses on the eco-
nomic consequences of an agreement, rather than on its form.
The Court characterized Broadcast Music as "squarely hold[ing]
that a joint selling arrangement may be so efficient that it will
increase seller's aggregate output and thus be
procompetitive."° 5
Several things now seem reasonably clear. The judiciary has
grown increasingly sensitive to the potential value of joint ven-
tures. The "firm" and "all else" dichotomy, prevalent in Sher-
man Act analysis for many years, no longer dominates.
Consequently, courts are more likely to judge true joint ventures
by a comprehensive rule of reason, regardless of the industry,
nature of business, or economic plight of the venturers.
B. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act'0 6 also poses a barrier to some
international joint ventures. In 1964, the Supreme Court held in
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co. '0 7 that certain joint ventures
must be treated as mergers under section 7. The Court treated
101 Id at 23.
102 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
103 Id. at 356.
104 Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
105 Id. at 2961.
106 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
107 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
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the venture involved in Penn-Olin-ajoinly owned plant for man-
ufacturing sodium chlorate in the southeastern United States-as
a product-extension merger for one partner (Olin) and a geo-
graphic-extension merger for the other (Pennsalt).1°8 The Court
held that the parents could not realistically be expected to com-
pete with the new entity, and that the venture had to be judged
under a potential entry theory.10 9 The trial court thus had to de-
termine if either partner would enter the market without thejoint
venture, and if the other would continue to be perceived as a
potential entrant.' 0 The Court viewed such a situation as prefer-
able to entry through the joint venture, producing one new com-
petitor and leaving one moderating force in the wings."' Penn-
Olin, however, recognized that joint ventures differ in one mate-
rial respect from horizontal mergers: joint ventures generally
add a competitor to the relevant market, while a horizontal
merger eliminates one. ' 2 Although the Court at that time was
applying a quasi-per se rule to horizontal ventures," 3 this recog-
nition of the important distinction between joint ventures and
regular mergers signaled a more sympathetic analysis.
III. APPLICATION To TRANSNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES
A. Extraterritorial Application Generally
This section develops the historic application of antitrust law
and policy to international joint ventures. To clarify the discus-
sion, however, the law as it relates generally to the extraterrito-
rial application of antitrust is briefly summarized.
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co." 4 the Supreme
Court held that the Sherman Act did not prohibit conduct occur-
ring in foreign nations, even though Americans were party to the
agreement and it adversely affected a competing American
firm." 5 The legality of foreign conduct was, in Justice Holmes's
108 Id. at 172 n.5. Pennsalt was producing and selling sodium chlorate in the north-
western United States while Olin was a chemical manufacturer located in the southeast
that was not producing the product. Prior to the creation of the joint manufacturing
venture challenged in this case, Olin was selling Pennsalt's sodium chlorate in limited
amounts in the southeast.
109 Id at 169, 171.
110 Id at 175-76.
1M1 Id. at 173-74.
112 Id. at 170.
113 See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-67 (1963).
114 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
115 The defendant, United Fruit Company, allegedly conspired with various foreign
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words, "determined wholly by the law of the country where the
act is done."' 16 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)" 7 ,
however, effectively put American Banana to rest.118 Alcoa held
that all conduct intended to have and having an anticompetitive
effect on U.S. foreign commerce violates the Sherman Act." 9
Since Alcoa, the Act's application to foreign activities largely par-
allels its domestic applications.
There have been two significant developments in this area
since Alcoa. The first was the explicit adoption of a comity stan-
dard in antitrust cases. In 1976, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 120 that
jurisdiction attaches to foreign conduct if (1) the activity has
some actual or intended effect on U.S. commerce; (2) the effect
presents an antitrust injury; and (3) "international comity and
fairness" do not caution against the exercise of jurisdiction.'
2'
Other courts have questioned the first two prongs of the
Timberlane test,122 but the third prong's comity analysis has won
wide acceptance. 23
Passage of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982124 was
the second major development since Alcoa. Title IV of the Act
essentially codified existing enforcement policy, 125 limiting the
reach of the Sherman Act and part of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act to export activities having a "direct, sub-
stantive and reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic com-
merce or on the export trade of a domestic competitor.' 26 The
Act was not intended to supplant the Timberlane comity analysis,
officials to prevent the plaintiff from successfully importing bananas to the United
States. Id. at 354-55.
116 Id at 356.
117 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
118 Although Alcoa dearly adopted an "effects" test, as opposed to the territorial
approach of American Banana, several earlier decisions had made the original territorial
standard of American Banana questionable. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,
274 U.S. 268 (1927); Thomson v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917). For thorough discussions
of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws, see B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON
MARKET AND INTERNATiONAL ANTITRUST 19- 78, Supp. 11-29 (1982); 1 J. ATWOOD & K.
BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 142-80 (2d ed. 1981).
119 Akoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44.
120 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
121 Id. at 613-15.
122 E.g., Nat'l Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981).
123 B. HAWK, supra note 118, at Supp. 18-25.
124 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (Supp. 1984).
125 Garvey, supra note 19, at 38-39 (1982). But see Rahl, Reforming American Antitrust
in Foreign Commerce, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1130, 1137 (1983).
126 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982).
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but rather to clarify the threshhold effects standard.127
B. Significant Transnational Joint Venture Decisions
This section explores several historically significant decisions
involving transnational joint ventures. The purpose is not to de-
velop these opinions in depth, but rather to demonstrate broadly
the enforcement policy prevalent among the courts. The deci-
sions show, in the author's judgment, an undue lack of regard for
the complexities and risks of international business transactions.
These judicial analyses have given insufficient weight to factors
that are unique to, or exaggerated in, an international context.
In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States 128 the Supreme
Court held that worldwide territorial allocation and pricing
agreements between Timken and several related foreign manu-
facturers violated the Sherman Act. Timken argued that the
agreements were ancillary to legitimate joint venture and trade-
mark licensing agreements formed to cope efficiently with barri-
ers to international trade. 129 The Court held, however, that
Timken could not avoid the Sherman Act's prohibition against
restrictive agreements by designating the relationship between
the parties ajoint venture.3 0 The Court also considered of little
moment the existence of foreign tariff and other barriers. 13 1 The
Sherman Act was, in the majority's view, unsympathetic to the
potential benefits of foreign investment: "free foreign commerce
in goods must [not] be sacrificed in order to foster export of
American dollars for investment in foreign factories which sell
abroad."'132 Congress was the appropriate body to consider and
remedy the complications of foreign commerce.' The remedy
in Timken, however, demonstrated some sensitivity to the value of
international joint ventures. Although three members of the
Court3 4 believed it appropriate to require Timken to sever its
relationship with its British and French coventurers, the majority
held it sufficient to enjoin the restrictive agreement. 3 5
In separate dissenting opinions, Justices Frankfurter andJack-
127 B. HAWK, supra note 118 at Supp. 25-28.
128 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
129 Id. at 597.
130 Id. at 598.
131 Id. at 599.
132 Id.
'33 Id.
134 Justices Black, Douglas and Minton.
l35 See Timken, 341 U.S. at 603-04 (Reed, J., concurring).
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son argued that the Court should not judge international transac-
tions by the same standards that applied domestically. 136 Justice
Jackson put the case well:
The philosophy of the Government, adopted by the
Court, is that Timken's conduct is conspiracy to restrain
trade solely because the venture made use of subsidiaries.
It is forbidden thus to deal with and utilize subsidiaries to
exploit foreign territories, because "parent and subsidiary
corporations must accept the consequences of maintaining
separate corporate entities," and that consequence is con-
spiracy to restrain trade. But not all agreements are con-
spiracies and not all restraints of trade are unlawful. In a
world of tariffs, trade barriers, empire or domestic prefer-
ences, and various forms of parochialism from which we
are by no means free, I think a rule that it is restraint of
trade to enter a foreign market through a separate subsidi-
ary of limited scope is virtually to foreclose foreign com-
merce of many kinds. It is one thing for competitors or a
parent and its subsidiaries to divide the United States do-
mestic market which is an economic and legal unit; it is
another for an industry to recognize that foreign markets
consist of many legal and economic units and to go after
each through separate means. I think this decision will re-
strain more trade than it will make free.'
37
United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing13 8 repre-
sented another significant development in the same era as
Timken.139 The defendants, competing manufacturers of abrasive
products in the United States, jointly owned abrasive manufac-
turing plants in Great Britain, Canada and Germany. The de-
fendants alleged that "they took these joint steps to preserve and
expand their foreign markets which were disappearing in the face
of foreign countries' tariffs, quotas, import controls, dollar
shortages, foreign exchange restrictions, local preference cam-
paigns and like nationalistic measures."' 140 Judge Wyzanski, how-
136 Id at 605-06 (Frankfurter, J. and Jackson, J., dissenting).
137 Id at 607-08 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). It is noteworthy that
the Supreme Court has recently moderated its rigid separate entities approach, even in
the context of domestic commerce. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,
104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984); see also supra note 50 and accompanying text; see supra text accom-
panying note 51.
138 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
139 Minnesota Mining is significant, at least in part, because its author, Judge Wyzan-
ski, was a leading jurist in the effort to synthesize law and economic analysis. See also
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
140 Minnesota Mining, 92 F. Supp. at 958.
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ever, applied a rigid antitrust standard. His decision sanctioned
such joint foreign activities by American companies only if it
were economically impossible for the firms to export domesti-
cally produced goods.' 4 ' He further suggested that, at least in
the context of an agreement between dominant firms, a foreign
manufacturing venture could be a per se violation of the Sher-
man Act, even if it were impossible to export domestic goods.
142
One could view the close association and exchange of data neces-
sary for operation of such a foreign venture as a conspiracy with
proscribed domestic effects.
143
Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC 144 applied the Penn-Olin standard
145
to one significant transnational joint venture. In Yamaha the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an FTC ruling that a
joint venture between Yamaha and Brunswick violated section 7.
Under the agreement, Brunswick, through a subsidiary named
Mariner, acquired 38% of the stock of Sanshin Kogyo Company,
a Yamaha subsidiary that manufactured outboard motors.'
46
Yamaha retained 38% of the stock, and the two firms shared con-
trol of Sanshin.147 Sanshin would produce and sell outboard mo-
tors to Yamaha and Mariner for resale under their names.
The FTC's administrative law judge originally upheld the ven-
ture, stating that "the main objective fact in this case. . . . is that
thejoint venture added to the relevant market a new pro-compet-
itive force-the Mariner line of outboard motors."'148 The Com-
mission reversed the administrative judge, however, finding that
Yamaha was an actual potential entrant into the U.S. outboard
motor market.149 Since Yamaha's subsequent independent entry
would enhance competition in a concentrated market, the joint
venture fell within the prohibitions of section 7.150
The General Motors-Toyota (GM-Toyota) joint venture rep-
resents the latest and most permissive development in the appli-
141 Id. at 959.
142 Id. at 963.
143 Id. Minnesota Mining is discussed further infra text accompanying notes 202-05.
144 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 106-13.
146 In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1176-77, 1187, 1263 (1979).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1247.
149 "[G]iven Yamaha's expansion history, strength in a variety of world and U.S.
markets, development of an advanced motor that an existing U.S. competitor regarded
as a market threat, with overall technological and financial capabilities, and stated entry
plans regarding the U.S. outboard motor market. . . . Yamaha was an actual potential
entrant into the U.S." Id at 1272.
150 Yamaha, 657 F.2d at 979-81.
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cation of U.S. antitrust laws to transnational joint ventures. The
Federal Trade Commission approved the venture after insisting
on some modifications. The decision represents a fairly dramatic
shift in the Commission's analytical approach and enforcement
philosophy. Detailed discussion of the decision appears later in
this article.1
5 1
IV. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The increasingly benign legal view ofjoint ventures manifests
in part the growing influence of two related economic develop-
ments. The "Chicago School"'152 emphasis upon productive and
allocative efficiency has had a significant effect upon antitrust ju-
risprudence.1 53 It is, therefore, not remarkable that joint ven-
tures, with their potential for efficient organization, are now less
suspect than they were in an earlier era.
Transaction-cost economics has an impact on antitrust analy-
sis, as well as on other areas of legal thought.15 4  One major
premise of traditional antitrust jurisprudence, for example, is in-
creasingly difficult to justify: the "firm" and "all other entities"
dichotomy 5 5 used for section 1 analysis embodied an unrealistic
perception about the nature of the firm. Transaction costs
largely control the exchange relationships between parties en-
gaged in a common endeavor.1-1 There are myriad organiza-
tional structures that can minimize the transaction costs of a
cooperative venture, and the most efficient organization may
151 See infra text accompanying notes 220-53.
152 See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).
153 Professor Hovenkamp maintains that modem antitrust developments have actu-
ally been informed by a synthesis of the Chicago and Harvard schools, the former focus-
ing on price theory and the latter on industrial organization. H. HOVENKAMP,
ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTrrRUST LAW, xvi (1984).
154 Williamson, Vertical Merger Guidelines: Interpreting the 1982 Reforms, in ANTITRUST
POLICY IN TRANSMON: THE CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 253, 260-65 (E. Fox
& F. Halverson eds. 1984). Transaction cost economics is largely the offspring of Ron-
ald Coase's famous theorem: "in an environment where there are no obstacles to transacting,
legal rights will tend ultimately to be allocated, through trade if necessary, to the party
that values them most highly, regardless of their initial assignment." C. Go=iz, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 52 (1984). Coase identified the value of his seminal work as paving the way
to analysis of "the real world of positive transaction costs." Coase, The Coase Theorem and
the Empty Core: A Comment 24J. L. & ECON. 183, 187 (1981). For an application of trans-
action costs analysis in a nonantitrust environment, see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-
Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1981).
155 See supra text accompanying notes 46-53.
156 R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 289-90 (2d ed. 1977); Williamson, supra
note 154, at 260-64.
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consist of varying degrees of integration at various levels of ex-
change. 157 Transaction-cost economics identifies two significant
factors bearing on the ultimate structure of ajoint endeavor: (1)
bounded rationality; and (2) opportunism. There are limits to
the abilities of contracting parties to anticipate every contingency
in extended economic relationships. Moreover, each party will
act in its own self-interest when unanticipated contingencies
arise. At times, therefore, a traditional contractual relationship
will be unacceptable to parties seeking a mutually beneficial ar-
rangement, and they may instead create a "firm." On the other
hand, the size or scope of the desired enterprise may render un-
attainable the control essential to a firm.' 59 Under such circum-
stances, some combination of firm (internal control) and market
(contract) relationship may be necessary for the enterprise to
thrive. This relationship is likely to be characterized as a joint
venture.
The lessons learned from economics about the relationship
between organization and transaction costs cannot be ignored in
antitrust analysis. Antitrust policies that compel total integration
may mandate transactional inefficiency, at times actually prevent-
ing an efficient organization from forming. This concern is espe-
cially pertinent in the context of international transactions, where
rationality is especially "bounded," control tenuous, and the oc-
casions for opportunism abundant.
A. International Trade
Classical economist David Ricardo developed the concept of
"comparative advantage" to explain trade patterns among na-
tions.' 60 A nation will export those goods that it can produce
relatively more efficiently than other nations, and will import
those it cannot. Trade should occur even though one country
has an absolute advantage or disadvantage in all of the goods
being traded, 16 1 since each nation will benefit. Government poli-
des that interfere with such transfers-tariffs and quotas, for ex-
ample-are deleterious to the nation imposing the restraints as
157 See Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1984); Goetz and
Scott, Prindpks of Relational Contracts, in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF LAW AND REGU-
LATION 152 (A. Ogus & C. Vejanovski eds. 1984).
158 Williamson, supra note 154, at 261.
159 R. POSNER, supra note 156, at 290.
160 p. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 628 (11th ed. 1980).
161 Id at 627.
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well as to their targets.162
Subsequently, the factor-abundance theory developed. 6 3
Numerous factors determine the level and quality of national out-
put, including the availability of labor, land, and capital. These
factors can be further broken down into skilled and unskilled la-
bor, fertile and non-fertile land, and so on. Under the factor-
abundance theory, nations will export those goods or services for
which they possess an abundance of the required factors. The
United States, for example, is rich in fertile land' 64 and skilled
labor;165 it has therefore traditionally exported crops and the
products of skilled laborers. 1
66
The level and flow of international trade is also influenced by
a nation's knowledge and technological development.1 67 A na-
tion whose entrepreneurs and industrialists better understand
market opportunities will have a comparative advantage in the
production of new or differentiated products. 168 Likewise, a
country with advanced technology will have an advantage in the
market for goods produced with modern technology. 169 These
advantages, however, are not constant; static theories cannot
fully explain international trade. Knowledge and technology are
transferable. Nations attaining these factors, therefore, may
combine them with other abundant factors and change the direc-
tion of trade in the relevant goods.' 70 Finally, capital, a major
production factor, is also highly transferable.
In a world of absolute free trade, the factors of production
would organize themselves internationally in order to achieve
maximum productivity. First World capital and technology, for
example, would unite with Third World labor where appropriate
in order to minimize the costs of production. Today, however,
one must add transaction-cost analysis to the equation. Even in a
world of free trade, organizing the most efficient international
transactions involves costs such as those of obtaining knowledge
and avoiding opportunistic behavior. In the real world, trade
162 Id at 634-36.
163 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at IV-4.
164 Id. at IV-50.
165 Md at IV-4.
166 Id. at III-1, IV-4.
167 Bowen, U.S. Comparative Advantage: A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Litera-
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barriers greatly exacerbate these costs. This article cannot iden-
tify each potential form of transnational joint venture nor the
costs involved in creating and maintaining each such venture. It
will, however, analyze some of the potentially significant costs
that may inhibit international transactions.
B. Transaction Costs
The costs of organizing enterprise across national lines are
similar to those affecting intranational transactions. In addition
to the costs of capital, labor and raw materials, there are the costs
of obtaining knowledge, overcoming legal and extralegal barri-
ers, and risk-bearing. These latter costs are likely to be greater in
the international context.
1. Legal and Extralegal Barriers
Legal and extralegal barriers to international transactions are
significant factors impairing, and thereby increasing the costs of,
transnational ventures. Defendants have traditionally cited the
existence of such barriers when seeking to justify transnational
ventures. 17 ' Legal and extralegal barriers include tariffs, quotas,
domestic preferences and foreign investment restrictions. Some
of these barriers are legally insurmountable, but a firm can avoid
others by crafting an appropriate organizational structure. One
commentator has described the relationship between regulatory
barriers and organizational structure as follows:
Government regulation of the joint venture falls into
several broad, arbitrary categories: regulations affecting
ownership and capitalization (the endowment of the joint
venture), regulations relating to management of the joint
venture, and regulations restricting economic activities by
non-nationals and general reporting requirements im-
posed by governments upon joint ventures which are
designed to gather information as a basis for future re-
strictive or regulative policy. To some extent, joint ven-
ture transactions are the answer to the inability of a non-
national to conceptualize and actualize a wholly-owned
project through acquisition or new investment in certain
governmental situations. The joint venture then is a crea-
171 See, e.g., Timken, 341 U.S. at 599 (rejecting 7-2 defendant's claim that foreign
cartels were necessary to avoid excessive foreign tariffs and, therefore, not a violation of
the Sherman Act); Minnesota Mining, 92 F. Supp. at 958.
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ture of government regulation.1
72
National policies that restrict some business relationships,
while promoting others, may promote any of several goals. Pro-
tective labor and investor policies are prominent. Governments
protect the owners of domestic production facilities and their la-
bor forces through tariffs, quotas or other restrictive policies
against "unfair" competition. 73 They may also subsidize signifi-
cant industries, either directly or indirectly, in order to provide a
competitive advantage at home or abroad.' 74 The net economic
impact on a nation imposing such protective policies is likely to
be negative, 175 yet most countries continue to impose some legal
restraints intended to protect existing domestic producers.
Restrictive policies may also promote domestic develop-
ment.' 76 A developing, labor-intensive nation, for example, may
foster foreign investments that transfer technology and know-
how to domestic producers 177 and ensure a growing pool of lo-
cally-controlled capital.' 78  Governments achieve this end
through various combinations of restraint and inducement. 79
Transactional restraints are sometimes considered essential
to national security.' 80 A nation wants to keep sensitive defense-
oriented technology in limited and friendly hands. Likewise, do-
mestic control of certain industries and facilities, such as the
merchant marine, is often necessary to ensure sufficient capacity
during national emergencies.'18  Finally, some policies manifest
nationalistic pride. Excessive dependence upon foreign nation-
als for goods and capital can diminish a nation's sense of in-
dependent sovereignty.'
8 2
All of these factors, and others, shape the way that transna-
tional business is conducted. If businesses are to organize effi-
dent enterprises within the framework of these myriad and
172 Hushon,Joint Ventures Between Multinationals: Government Regulatory Aspects, 6 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 207, 208-09 (1981).
173 J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 435-36
(1977); Radway, supra note 31, at 58.
174 J. JACKSON, supra note 173, at 442.
175 P. SAMUELSON, supra note 160, at 653-57.
176 Id at 659.
177 Radway, supra note 31, at 47, 51-75.
178 Id. at 64.
179 Radway, for example, identifies a variety of related laws adopted by South Amer-
ican countries. IdL at 52-57.
180 P. SAMUELSON, supra note 160, at 652.
181 Id
182 See Radway, supra note 31, at 48-49.
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sometimes conflicting legal and customary restraints, they must
have the flexibility to respond with minimum cost.
2. Information Costs
The costs of obtaining knowledge may pose significant barri-
ers to efficient transactions. For example, few, if any, consumers
will price automobiles at every dealership in a major metropoli-
tan area; the costs of the search would exceed all possible sav-
ings. Yet the consequence may be a less-than-optimal
transaction-i.e., a higher price than would be possible with com-
plete knowledge.
The cost of obtaining complete knowledge in an international
setting is, for many reasons, likely to be substantially greater than
in the domestic sphere. Differences in language, custom, and law
raise barriers to obtaining full information. A joint venture with
participants from each nation involved may effectively reduce this
barrier by internalizing these costs.' 3 The venture can bring
knowledgeable individuals within its control structure and pro-
vide incentives for faithful performance, rather than relying on
market transactions to acquire needed information.
8 4
3. Risk-bearing Costs
Risk-bearing is the transaction cost most heightened in an in-
ternational context. A rational businesswoman will reduce the
expected value of a business transaction by the perceived risk of
loss.' 8 5 She will also be more averse to risk as the investment
increases in proportion to her wealth.' 86 For many of the reasons
previously discussed, including legal restraints and imperfect
knowledge, the risks of international transactions are higher than
those in domestic markets.
Opportunism may also pose a significant risk in transnational
business transactions. A foreign venturer may have the support,
or at least the sympathy, of his own government and courts when
he behaves opportunistically. For example, an American firm
transferring know-how overseas may lose the benefits of its ex-
clusive knowledge should its foreign partners breach secrecy
agreements. When American jurisdiction is unavailable, however,
foreign bodies sympathetic to the goals of their own nationals
183 See R. POSNER, supra note 156, at 289-90.
184 Id.
185 C. GOETZ, supra note 154, at 77-79.
186 Id. at 79-82.
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will determine the fact of breach and the available remedy. The
policies of many developing nations are in fact largely hostile to
efforts by foreigners to protect technology or intellectual prop-
erty transferred to their citizens. 187 Mexico, for example, actually
requires foreign licensors of technology to transfer the technol-
ogy to Mexican licensees after a limited license period. 88
Some of the increased risk factors of international transac-
tions are beyond the control of the parties. Various external fac-
tors, for example, determine critical changes in monetary
exchange rates. Moreover, in some environments, revolutions
and other political upheavals represent substantial risks to those
conducting business. Companies can purchase insurance against
some types of risks. 89 Well structured cooperative ventures can
minimize other risks at lower internal costs.
C. Summary of Economic Considerations
Organizing a business across national boundaries is more
complex and risky than organizing a domestic enterprise is. Yet,
economic theory suggests that if participating nations can effi-
ciently bring together the various international factors of produc-
tion, all the nations will benefit. Each nation can then exploit its
own comparative advantages. Business should, therefore, struc-
ture itself in ways that promote transnational enterprise within
real-world constraints imposed by law, custom, and transactional
limitations.
The goal of every legitimate cooperative business enterprise
is to provide desired goods or services profitably at prices lower
than those of its competition. Prospective transnational ventur-
ers, however, face variables that do not generally apply domesti-
cally. In particular, legal and cultural barriers may prohibit the
most efficient organizational structure. Additionally, these barri-
ers heighten, at times substantially, the costs of risk-bearing. The
nature and extent of these structural barriers, as well as the de-
gree of risk, will vary among nations.
All of these factors suggest that transnational venturers
should have substantial freedom to structure international enter-
prise efficiently. They must respond to factors that vary from
country to country, and from time to time. Ventures must over-
187 Radway, supra note 31, at 56-57.
188 Hushon, supra note 172, at 213.
189 The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) provides some political
risk insurance to Americans investing abroad. Id. at 219.
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come legal impediments, secure information, and minimize risk.
In some countries it may be possible to operate through wholly-
owned or controlled subsidiaries, while others may prohibit this
practice by law. A traditional contractual (buyer/seller) relation-
ship may be desirable in some situations, but it may lack neces-
sary permanence in others. Intermediate levels of cooperation or
integration-joint ventures-may represent the only possible
way for some transnational business to exist efficiently. Antitrust
policy should not needlessly impair such organizations.
D. Political Considerations
The preceding sections have highlighted the economic impli-
cations of political interference in market transactions. In addi-
tion, one should note that nations can derive direct political
benefits from cooperative transnational ventures. Nations having
shared economic interests are more likely to have common social
and political goals than those that do not. The European Com-
munity, for example, has fostered economic cooperation as a ve-
hicle to achieve greater social and political cohesion.1 90
Conversely, the lack of full economic cooperation has exacer-
190 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), Mar.
25, 1957, arts. 2-3, U.K.T.S. 15 (1979) (Cmnd. 7460), 298 U.N.T.S. 11. Article 2
provides:
It shall be the aim of the Community by establishing a Common Market
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to
promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accel-
erated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between its Member
States.
Article 3 provides:
For the purposes set out in the preceding Article, the activities of the Com-
munity shall include, under the conditions and with the timing provided for in
this Treaty: (a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties
and of quantitative restrictions in regard to the importation and exportation of
goods, as well as of all other measures with equivalent effect; (b) the establish-
ment of a common customs tariff and of a common commercial policy towards
third countries; (c) the abolition, as between Member States, of the obstacles to
the free movement of persons, services and capital; (d) the inauguration of a
common agricultural policy; (e) the inauguration of a common transport policy;
(f) the establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be dis-
torted in the Common Market; (g) the application of procedures which shall
make it possible to co-ordinate [sic] the economic policies of Member States
and to remedy disequilibria in their balances of payments; (h) the approxima-
tion of their respective municipal law to the extent necessary for the function-
ing of the Common Market; (i) the creation of a European Social Fund in order
to improve the possibilities of employment for workers and to contribute to the
raising of their standard of living; (j) the establishment of a European Invest-
ment Bank intended to facilitate the economic expansion of the Community
through the creation of new resources; (k) the association of overseas countries
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bated political tensions. The perceptions of Americans and
Europeans that Japan unfairly invades their markets while ex-
cluding foreign goods from its own is becoming an increasing
source of political tension between otherwise friendly nations. 9 1
In the context of less-developed nations, the political benefits of
joint ventures may be more dramatic. The development of sub-
stantial domestic enterprises that exploit local strengths through
joint ventures are likely to bring increased wealth and knowl-
edge, planting the seeds of economic growth and political
stability.1
92
V. DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH To TRANSNATIONAL
JOINT VENTURES
This section discusses in greater detail two categories of
transnational joint ventures that the courts have subjected to an-
titrust analysis: (1) outbound ventures-those adding enterprise
capacity outside of the United States, and (2) inbound ventures-
those creating new enterprise capability in the United States. Ad-
mittedly, these classifications are arbitrary and lack clear legal
significance. Ultimately, the legal consequence of any venture
depends upon its effects on American commerce. It is, however,
analytically helpful to distinguish between ventures having their
immediate impact outside of the United States and those having
largely domestic effects.
A. Outbound Ventures
Outbound ventures may facilitate the sale of American goods
or services abroad, create new productive capacity in a foreign
nation, or achieve some combination of both. Such a venture
may, for example, create a foreign sales agency to sell the wares
of the American venturers, manufacture goods abroad, and also
buy and sell goods produced elsewhere.
A "pure" export association currently poses the fewest
problems under the antitrust laws. Since 1918 the Webb-Pomer-
ene Act has recognized a limited antitrust exemption for these
and territories with the community with a view to increasing trade and to pursu-
ingjointly their efforts towards economic and social development.
Id at 11-12, 298 U.N.T.S. 15-16.
191 See Senate Urges Reagan to Act Against Japan, Wash. Post, Mar. 29, 1985, at Al, col.
4.
192 Radway, supra note 31, at 63, 68.
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associations.' 93 More recently, the Export Trading Company Act
of 1982194 has limited the Sherman and Federal Trade Commis-
sion Acts' coverage of concerted export activities and has estab-
lished a certification procedure administered by the Department
of Commerce. Export activities are no longer subject to the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act or the "unfair methods of com-
petition" portion of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, unless they have a direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
seeable effect on domestic commerce or the export trade of a
U.S. competitor.' 95 Furthermore, certification by the Commerce
Department provides substantial protection against antitrust lia-
bility for activities within the scope of the certificate.
196
Cooperative ventures that restrict exports from 1 9 7 or imports
to the United States are the most problematic. The Timken and
Minnesota Mining cases addressed these problems. The territorial
allocations in Timken had characteristics of an international cartel,
and condemnation may have been appropriate. 9 8 The Court's
approach, however, would readily condemn efficient, productive
ventures as well as anticompetitive cartels. Noting that the Sher-
man Act embodies an "assumption. . . .that export and import
trade in commodities is both possible and desirable,"' 99 the
Court seemed unwilling to consider the fact that foreign policy
and custom may preclude such trade. Only Congress, the Court
held, could accommodate parties seeking to overcome trade bar-
riers through cooperative ventures that restrained U.S. foreign
commerce. 20
0
The extreme position taken by the Court in Timken-holding
that they would treat foreign commercial activities no differently
than domestic conduct in the antitrust area-ignores economic
and political reality. When the most efficient, and perhaps only
193 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982).
194 Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982).
195 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982).
196 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-21 (1982) (procedures for receiving and maintaining ex-
port trade certificates of review and the protection conferred by certificates).
197 Unfortunately, export associations enjoy an antitrust exemption under the
Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982), even when engaged in traditional car-
tel activities, such as output restriction and price enhancement. See NAT'L COMM'N, supra
note 30, at 298-300.
198 Timken, 341 U.S. at 597-98 (reciting District Court's finding that "the dominant
purpose of the restrictive agreements. . . .was to avoid all competition either among
themselves or with others."). For facts and holding of Timken, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 128-37.
199 Id. at 599.
200 Id
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possible, way for an American firm to sell abroad is to combine
its strengths-patents, trade secrets, know-how, management
skills-with foreign labor or capital, that firm must protect itself
against unreasonable competition from its foreign partners, as
well as from the new entity. If, for example, foreign producers
have a major competitive advantage because their labor costs are
substantially lower than American producers, the transfer of
American know-how or technology without reasonable restric-
tions could devastate the domestic firm.20' Moreover, the vagar-
ies of foreign economic policies and the fear of opportunistic
abuse may make a transfer of business secrets undesirable with-
out ongoing supervision and control. Under such circumstances,
an otherwise desirable transaction would not occur, to the detri-
ment of both American producers and foreign consumers.
Meanwhile, potential foreign competitors would naturally
seek the undisclosed information through legal and sometimes
illegal means. Competitors have successfully used reverse engi-
neering and industrial espionage in the past to penetrate markets
developed by American firms. When foreign producers succeed,
American competitors lose actual and potential foreign markets;
if the cost advantages of foreign production are substantial,
American producers ultimately may lose their domestic market.
The advantages of permitting restrictive agreements under these
circumstances are manifest. Firms can maintain domestic produc-
tion and perhaps secure some export markets. While a low-cost
foreign producer exporting goods to the United States adversely
affects our trade balance, a foreign joint venture will send capital
to its American parent, improving our trade account.
If legal and extralegal barriers to trade and foreign invest-
ment did not exist, restrictive joint ventures might not be justi-
fied. The American producer with desirable knowledge or ability
could simply open foreign operations, as either wholly-owned
subsidiaries or divisions. The producer would then be free, short
of a monopolistic violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, to set
prices and allocate markets among its various operations. In the
"real world" of international investment, however, these options
may not be available. A restrictive joint venture-restrictive to
201 The Justice Department recognizes that restraints on competition under such
circumstances should be permitted if reasonable in scope or duration. ANTITRUST Div.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 28-31 (rev.
ed. Mar. 1, 1977) reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1
(Feb.l, 1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRusT GUIDE].
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prevent opportunism and joint to overcome legal hurdles-may
then be the second best option.
Judge Wyzanski's decision in Minnesota Mining was particularly
insensitive to the factors that foster overseas production, and to
the benefits that can flow from the profits received by Americans
that have invested in foreign production. °2 The goals thatJudge
Wyzanski attached to the antitrust laws may explain the outcome
in Minnesota Mining: "Congress in the Sherman Act has con-
demned whatever unreasonably restrains American commerce
regardless of how it fattens profits of certain stockholders. Con-
gress has preferred to protect American competitors, consumers
and workmen. ' 20 3 It is unlikely, however, that American con-
sumers would be injured solely by foreign manufacturing activi-
ties. In fact, prices are likely to decrease domestically if fewer
finished products are exported for sale abroad. Prices will pre-
dictably drop as the domestic supply increases.20 4
Foreign production is also unlikely to affect American com-
petitors adversely, at least not in ways that invoke antitrust con-
cerns. Antitrust is intended to protect competition, not
competitors,20 5 and should not prevent American producers
from organizing efficiently to capture foreign markets. If, under
cases like Minnesota Mining, Americans cannot jointly create for-
eign productive capacity legally, unless it is impossible to export
U.S.-made goods, foreign producers may effectively reserve
those markets for themselves. Individual firms may lack the ca-
pacity to finance or assume the risks of foreign production; even
when it is economically possible, foreign laws may bar individual
entry. Since the U.S. antitrust laws cannot protect domestic firms
from the competition of more efficient foreign producers in for-
eign markets, courts should not interpret these laws to prevent
U.S. firms from reasonably achieving efficiencies available to
others.
The final goal identified by Judge Wyzanski discloses the most
likely justification for his decision: protecting American jobs.
This goal is difficult to justify and potentially self-defeating.
Once again, if antitrust bars Americans from investing in efficient
202 For facts and holding of the Minnesota Mining decision, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 138-43.
203 Minnesota Mining, 92 F. Supp. at 962.
204 See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDI-
NATION & CONTROL 60-62 (3d ed. 1983) (explaining the effect of adjustments to supply).
205 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2740 n.14.
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foreign production, it will invite foreign controlled competition.
Protectionism may also cost jobs in the United States: if the prof-
its that the court found so distressing do not flow to American
investors, they may be prompted to move their capital to differ-
ent industries or abroad.
The paucity of cases relating to ventures having their primary
impact outside of the United States may demonstrate that the
government has generally recognized their potential for efficient
organization. The Justice Department, for example, has adopted
a fairly sympathetic rule of reason approach to the analysis of
transnational joint ventures.2 0 One can interpret Timken and
Minnesota Mining, therefore, as extraordinary factual situations-
one involving an association having characteristics of a world-
wide cartel, the other involving a union of dominant competitors
with substantial control over a natural resource essential to
would-be competitors. Their analyses, however, if followed liter-
ally, would prohibit many desirable ventures. Timken's slavish
commitment to form, under which the venturers' separate legal
identities condemned them to a per se prohibition against pric-
ing or territorial agreements, and Minnesota Mining's protective
labor position pose particular threats to those contemplating de-
sirable and productive ventures.
B. Inbound Ventures
Those ventures that create new enterprise capability in the
United States raise different issues. They bring new products or
enterprise capacity and, therefore, competition to the United
States. The FTC has recently subjected two major ventures shar-
ing these characteristics to significant antitrust scrutiny: the
Yamaha-Brunswick and the GM-Toyotajoint ventures. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission found that the former violated section 7
of the Clayton Act but, approximately five years later, allowed the
GM-Toyota venture to proceed. The differences in analyses be-
tween the two cases are striking. They demonstrate a significant
shift in economic focus, one emphasizing concentration and the
other efficiency. A comparison of these two determinations may
hint at the likely direction of antitrust enforcement in the area of
transnational joint ventures.
206 See generally ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 201.
363
STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. Yamaha-Brunswick
As already noted, Yamaha and Brunswick, through a subsidi-
ary named Mariner, became equal owners of Sanshin, a Japanese
outboard motor manufacturer. °7 Sanshin planned to produce
motors which its parents would sell under their Yamaha and Mar-
iner brand labels.2 °8 Yamaha was granted the exclusive right to
sell Sanshin motors in Japan, and Mariner was given exclusive
rights to sales in North America and Australia.2 °9 Initially, the
venture was to last for ten years, followed by automatic three-
year renewals unless either side decided to terminate the
agreement.21 0
Brunswick already produced and sold motors domestically
under the Mercury brand name.21 ' Prior to founding the joint
venture, Brunswick's Mercury division determined that it needed
a second, low horsepower, low price outboard motor to sell
under a different brand.21 2 Yamaha produced and sold outboard
motors abroad. 1 It had unsuccessfully attempted to penetrate
the American market by selling to Sears for resale under the
Sears label, but the price of its motor was too high for the Sears
market.2 4
The Federal Trade Commission's administrative law judge
(ALJ) determined that any likely anticompetitive effects of the
venture were outweighed by two beneficial effects: (1) the ven-
ture produced a new entrant, Mariner, into the American market,
and (2) it enhanced the likelihood of Yamaha's future entry.215
The Commission, however, reversed the ALJ, applying a section
7 potential entrant analysis. The Commission found that
Yamaha was an actual potential entrant, i.e., that it would enter
the market independently if the venture was not an available op-
tion. 6 Yamaha had all the indicia of an entrant: name recogni-
tion, a distribution system in place (for motorcycles and
snowmobiles), and the ability to produce a full line of outboard
motors. Moreover, the Commission found that the joint venture
2 07 See supra text accompanying notes 145-47.
208 In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1187-88 (1979).
209 Id
210 Id at 1187.
211 Id. at 1182.
212 Id at 1204.
213 Id. at 1184-85.
214 Id. at 1209.
215 Id. at 1254.
216 Id. at 1272.
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removed Yamaha as an existing competitive threat to American
producers. "Yamaha's ability to inspire the fear of competition
in the hearts of U.S. manufacturers was already clear before
Yamaha entered the joint venture. '2 17 On remand, the ALJ rec-
ommended that the Commission require the parties to terminate
the joint venture. The FTC ordered Mariner to sell its Sanshin
stock holdings to Yamaha within ninety days at a price deter-
mined by "the value of the net tangible assets per share. ' 218 The
decision was upheld, with some minor modifications, by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
219
The decision of the FTC in the Yamaha-Brunswick case
demonstrated a strong commitment to structural analysis (consis-
tent with section 7 jurisprudence) and a limited concern for "effi-
ciency" arguments. The market would be structurally superior if
Yamaha remained as a potential entrant or entered de novo. The
fact that the joint venture facilitated entry of a new brand, al-
lowing both Brunswick and Yamaha to participate more mean-
ingfully in the U.S. market, was not compelling to the
Commission. The benefits of actual or perceived potential indi-
vidual entry outweighed the concrete benefits of an actual joint
entry.
2. General Motors-Toyota
The GM-Toyotajoint venture was subjected to a different sort
of analysis than was the Yamaha-Brunswick agreement. The FTC
majority was largely unconcerned with structural issues, focusing
instead on potential efficiencies-not potential competition-and
transaction costs. 220 On February 17, 1983, General Motors and
Toyota announced that they had reached an agreement to pro-
duce jointly a subcompact car in the United States. 22' The ven-
ture would produce a version of the Toyota "Sprinter," a model
then being sold only in Japan, at GM's Fremont, California,
plant.222 The two firms would share equally in the equity of the
217 Id. at 1273.
218 Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 1981).
219 Id
220 See General Motors Corp. and Toyota Motor Corp; Correction, 48 Fed. Reg.
57,314 (1983) (statement of Chairman James C. Miller III, Commissioner George W.
Douglas and Commissioner Terry Calvani) [hereinafter cited as GM-Toyota Majority
Statement].
221 Note, The GM-Toyota Joint Venture: Legal Cooperation or Illegal Combination in the
World Automobile Industy? 19 TEx. INT'L L. J. 699, 705 (1984).
222 General Motors Corp. and Toyota Motor Corp.; Proposed Consent Agreement
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new corporation and elect an equal number of directors.223
Toyota, however, would appoint the principal manager.224 Each
parent would provide approximately half of the component
parts, which would be assembled at Fremont by members of the
United Auto Workers union.2 25
Prevailing section 7 standards would likely invalidate the GM-
Toyota joint venture. As of 1984 GM was the largest automobile
manufacturer inf the world,226 and had equity interests in other
foreign automobile producers, including Isuzu and Suzuki.227 It
sold more passenger cars than any other producer, in either the
United States or the rest of the world.228 Toyota was the third
largest automobile manufacturer in the world.229 It ranked
fourth in sales volume in the United States for all passenger cars,
and second for subcompacts.23 °
The relative size of these firms, the concentrated nature of the
automobile industry, and the likelihood that either or both would
expand their positions in the subcompact market regardless of
the venture, would have made the agreement extremely suspect
ifjudged by the standards applied in Penn-Olin or Brunswick.23' In
this case, however, the Commission's majority dismissed tradi-
tional structural analysis:
In conducting its analysis, the Commission recognized
that the Fremont venture should not be viewed factually as
a merger between GM and Toyota because the areas of
continued competition between the companies will dwarf
the limited area of cooperation represented by the joint
venture. Because the structure and the small size of the
venture does [sic] not appear to pose any significant struc-
tural problems, traditional concentration analysis, whether
expressed through Hefindahls [sic] or other measures, will
With Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 48 Fed. Reg. 57,246, 57,248, 57,251 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as GM-Toyota Proposed Consent Agreement].
223 Id. at 57,248.
224 Id.
225 GM-Toyota Majority Statement, 48 Fed. Reg. at 57,315.
226 GM-Toyota Proposed Consent Agreement, 48 Fed. Reg. at 57,252 (Comm'r
Michael Pertschuk, dissenting).
227 Note, supra note 221, at 705 n.38.
228 GM-Toyota Proposed Consent Agreement, 48 Fed. Reg. at 57,252.
229 Clanton, Horizontal Agreements, The Rule of Reason, and the General Motors- Toyota Joint
Venture, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 1239, 1257 (1984).
230 GM-Toyota Proposed Consent Agreement, 48 Fed. Reg. at 57,252. See also
Clanton, supra note 229, at 1257 n.57.
231 See supra text accompanying notes 106-13, 144-51.
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be of limited value.232
This analysis ignores the fact that the market for subcompact
cars might be structurally superior if both Toyota and GM ex-
panded internally or if they remained as potential market
entrants.
Having disposed of the structural concerns, the majority
found three principal benefits to the venture. First, it would in-
crease the number of subcompact cars available to American con-
sumers.233 Second, the venture would enable GM to produce
cars immediately at a lower cost than it could manage indepen-
dently. 34 Finally, GM would learn Japanese management and
manufacturing techniques. 23 5 The Commission majority did rec-
ognize, however, two problems with the venture as originally
proposed. First, the venturers had agreed to make future joint
decisions about production levels. If the corporation were per-
mitted to expand indefinitely, however, its perceived benefits
could be lost: neither GM nor Toyota would ever establish an
independent competing firm.23 6 Under FTC pressure, therefore,
the parties consented to limit the venture to a single plant with a
maximum capacity of about 250,000 units annually and to limit
the agreement's term to twelve years.237 The risk of excessive
and anticompetitive communications between two major compet-
itors also concerned the majority.2 38 The consent decree thus re-
stricted the nature of communications between the firms and
imposed an obligation on the parties to document certain
conversations.23 9
Commissioners Bailey and Pertschuk dissented. Commis-
sioner Bailey's statement captured the dissenters strong feelings:
In this decision, the Commission has swept another set
of generally recognized antitrust law principles into the
dustbin, using again the incorporeal economic rhetoric
that now dominates Commission decision-making. In this




236 Id at 57,316.
237 General Motors Corp. and Toyota Motor Corp.; Prohibited Trade Practices, and
Affirmative Corrective Actions, 49 Fed. Reg. 18,289, 18,290 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
GM-Toyota Final Order]. The time period was later cut by the parties to eight years as
part of a settlement with Chrysler Corporation. BurgessJoint Auto Pact Set, Wash. Post,
Apr. 16, 1985, at DI, col. 6.
238 GM-Toyota Majority Statement, 48 Fed. Reg. at 57,316.
239 GM-Toyota Final Order, 49 Fed. Reg. at 18,290-91.
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case, the decision results in the blessing of a business pro-
posal that is both breathtaking in its audacity and mind-
numbing in its implications for future joint ventures be-
tween leading U.S. firms and major foreign competitors
that seek to lend a friendly helping hand. 40
Applying traditional section 7 analysis-as in Penn-Oil and
Brunswick-the dissenters found the purported efficiency gains to
be elusive but the anticompetitive threat very real.24 ' Unlike the
majority, they found a structural analysis both appropriate and
damning. The venture brought together two price leaders, both
of which were dominant in relevant markets.242 Long-term struc-
tural implications were even more perplexing. An approval of
this merger would, in the dissenters' view, invite similar partner-
ships between other American and foreign automobile manufac-
turers.243 This concern has been borne out. Chrysler has
announced plans to produce small cars in America through a
joint venture with Mitsubishi; 244 Ford has agreed to produce a
car jointly in Mexico with Toyo Kogyo (Mazda). 4 5
Several additional factors helped provoke the dissents. GM's
own studies showed that the joint venture would not increase the
volume of cars sold in the United States; most of the new output
would replace sales of other Toyota or GM cars. 46 The transfer
price of the venture's car is tied to the price of Toyota's Corolla,
giving Toyota significant control over the ultimate sales price of
its future competitor.24 7 Despite restrictions imposed by the con-
sent decree, the two corporations will exchange significant com-
petitively sensitive data.2 48 Finally, the majority's failure to
consider the possibility of less restrictive ways to achieve the pur-
ported benefits of the joint endeavor disturbed Bailey and Pert-
schuk.249  Less dominant Japanese firms could provide
knowledge and experience to U.S. firms seeking to capture supe-
240 GM-Toyota Proposed Consent Agreement, 48 Fed. Reg. at 57,257 (Comm'r Pa-
tricia P. Bailey, dissenting).
241 Id. at 57,255-56; see also id. at 57,252-53 (Comm'r Pertschuk, dissenting).
242 GM-Toyota Proposed Consent Agreement, 48 Fed. Reg. at 57,252 (Comm'r
Pertschuk, dissenting).
243 Id.; GM-Toyota Proposed Consent Agreement, 48 Fed. Reg. at 57,255 (Comm'r
Bailey, dissenting).
244 Burgess, supra note 237, at DI, col. 6.
245 Note, supra note 221, at 705 n.37.
246 GM-Toyota Proposed Consent Agreement, 48 Fed. Reg. at 57,257 (Comm'r Bai-
ley, dissenting).
247 Id. at 57,255.
248 Id. at 57,256.
249 Id. at 57,254 (Comm'r Pertschuk, dissenting).
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riorJapanese productivity and managerial know-how. 2 ° Indeed,
some of these firms already had ties to GM.2 5' The majority,
however, was generally uninterested in these less threatening
alternatives.
What does the GM-Toyota decision suggest for future anti-
trust analysis? It is dangerous to generalize. The Commission's
decision demonstrates the ascendency of efficiency-oriented
economists in the current administration. These individuals see
greater potential gains from cooperative economic activity than
traditional antitrust analysis will usually admit, and they have
more faith in the self-correcting power of markets than antitrust
precedents will generally acknowledge. Moreover, the FTC's de-
parture from traditional analysis seems so dramatic that the case
may have little impact on judicial developments. It is less a well-
articulated and justified evolution of antitrust law than it is an
economic leap of faith. The majority's statement is driven largely
by theory, brushing aside facts that have significant intuitive and
legal value. A court would be less likely to overlook the admis-
sions of the parties concerning, for example, static overall output
and the anticipated effects of the venture's pricing mechanism.
Furthermore, the availability of less threatening alternatives is a
major consideration in traditional antitrust analysis.
However, neither the extraordinary facts of the GM-Toyota
case nor the FTC's failure to justify its analytical approach de-
tracts from the contribution the case makes to a realistic antitrust
analysis in the area of transnationaljoint ventures. The Commis-
sion brought transaction cost analysis to the fore by treating this
monumental joint venture largely as a device to minimize the
costs of obtaining knowledge. Courts should not reflexively con-
demn organizational structures that overcome knowledge and
other barriers while minimizing transaction costs. Perhaps the
most valuable contribution of the GM-Toyotajoint venture to the
American economy is its ability to foster a new, industry-wide
productive environment. The Japanese management structure
may help induce American workers and suppliers to accept new
business relationships and working conditions.252 The United
Auto Workers union has, in fact, demonstrated its willingness to
enter into different, less costly labor contracts with Japanese
manufacturers in the United States and with the GM-Toyotajoint
250 Id
251 Note, supra note 221, at 705 n.38.
252 Cf GM-Toyota Majority Statement, 48 Fed. Reg. at 57,315.
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venture.253 This change ultimately could lead the entire industry
to a new international competitive structure,254 and do so with
fewer adjustment pains-transaction costs of change-than a to-
tally domestic restructuring would generate.
C. Synthesis
The potential of joint ventures to produce new, efficient en-
terprise capacity requires a careful and sympathetic analysis.
Neither a rigid "separate entities" approach under section 1 nor
an inflexible section 7 structural analysis is desirable. Antitrust
analysis is surely moving in this direction. The Justice Depart-
ment's International Operations Guidelines,255 for instance,
demonstrate a more flexible section 1 analysis than that of the
established case law. The Department's enforcement policy is far
more sympathetic than a literal application of Timken and Minne-
sota Mining would suggest.
The "joint venture" is a particularly common form of
business organization in the international field, for a vari-
ety of entirely legitimate reasons. Somejoint ventures are,
• . . essentially "one shot" consortia engaged in a single
venture limited in time and scope. Others may involve
what are essentially permanent combinations for the pro-
duction or distribution of products and services. Joint
ventures may be designed for a variety of business rea-
sons-e.g., to take advantage of complementary skills or
large economies of scale, to spread large risks, or to give
international enterprise a local flavor.256
Section 7 analysis is more problematic. The GM-Toyota ma-
jority statement represents an analysis that is sympathetic to the
international benefits of transnational joint ventures. The Com-
mission reached its conclusion, however, largely by ignoring sec-
tion 7 jurisprudence. The decision points the way to a sound and
sympathetic analysis, but it does not pursuasively suggest how
existing precedents can take the business counselor to that point;
the case thus has limited predictive value.
253 Brown, UA W, Mazda Agree on Terms for New Michigan Plant, Wash. Post, June 11,
1985, at D3, col. 4.
254 GM-Toyota Majority Statement, 48 Fed. Reg. at 57,315.
255 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 201.
256 Id. at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The United States is not an insular market. International
trade is an essential part of its economy, and the United States
has become increasingly unsuccessful in efforts to maintain a rea-
sonable balance in its trade relationships. American producers
often have trouble exporting their goods abroad or even compet-
ing at home with foreign-made goods. This new reality calls for a
more comprehensive approach to international transactions than
courts have traditionally applied in antitrust analysis. Merchan-
dise and services are not the only goods that travel across na-
tional boundaries; firms also import and export capital,
technology, know-how and managerial skills. Complex and di-
verse organizational structures may be essential to locate, assem-
ble, and manage resources efficiently within the constraints of
local law and custom.
Antitrust offers two broad types of analysis: per se rules and
the rule of reason. In their extreme forms, the former are con-
sciously rigid, while the latter is infinitely flexible. Neither type
of analysis by itself serves particularly well to evaluate a transna-
tional joint venture. A simple per se rule of either legality or
illegality would exaggerate either the benefits or the harms asso-
ciated with a particular venture. A full rule of reason analysis, on
the other hand, would needlessly complicate cases involving such
complex relationships. Where, then, should the courts draw the
line? Courts should judge bona fide transnational joint ventures
by the rule of reason, according them a strong presumption of
validity. Those challenging such a venture should be required to
establish convincingly that the transaction is, or is highly likely to
be, anticompetitive. This terminology may be imprecise, but it is
not without legal significance. Businesses could confidently pro-
ceed with ventures that stimulate international productivity.
Legal advisors could be less cautious in their role as counselors.
When possible, the judiciary should also shape remedies that
preserve productive joint ventures. The restrictions agreed to by
GM and Toyota, for example, demonstrate several limitations
that can minimize the potential harm of cooperative endeavors:
restrictions on productive scope, duration of the venture, and in-
formation exchanges. Courts should impose such restraints,
however, only when they are essential to the maintenance of a
competitive market.
This proposal may reflect existing policy under section 1 of
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the Sherman Act. If not, there are established precedents 25 7 and
contemporary decisions 258 that would support the judicial crea-
tion of a policy that supports productive transnational joint ven-
tures. Section 7, on the other hand, may require legislative
changes.2 59 It reaches anticompetitive effects in their incipiency
260 and focuses on market structure. The National Cooperative
Research Act of 1984261 provides a model for a reasonable
amendment. It provides:
Sec. 3. In any action under the antitrust laws, or under
any State law similar to the antitrust laws, the conduct of
any person in making or performing a contract to carry
out a joint research and development venture shall not be
deemed illegal per se; such conduct shall be judged on the
basis of its reasonableness, taking into account all relevant
factors affecting competition, including, but not limited to,
effects on competition in properly defined, relevant re-
search and development markets.262
Transnationaljoint ventures should be recognized in antitrust
analysis as organizations largely structured to meet complex in-
ternational circumstances. They often bring production factors
together to achieve otherwise unattainable efficiencies. When
they bring truly new enterprise capacity into existence, coopera-
tive transnational business endeavors should be presumptively
valid. The benefits are tangible, although the reasons for the
particular structure may be difficult to identify or measure.
Therefore, those challenging such ventures under the antitrust
laws should properly carry a heavier than usual burden. They
should clearly establish an actual or extremely likely antitrust in-
jury. Additionally, courts should attempt to salvage transnational
ventures by excizing offending provisions. The United States
and its trading partners are likely to gain in efficiency and pro-
ductivity if antitrust policy recognizes the unique role of joint
ventures in international commerce.
257 See supra text accompanying notes 56-66, 79-85.
258 See supra text accompanying notes 88-105.
259 See Garvey, Exports, Banking and Antitrust. The Export Trading Company Act-A Mod-
est Tool for Export Promotion, 5 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 818, 834, 838 (1983). As Secretary
of Commerce, Malcolm Baldrige suggested that section 7 should be repealed. 48 ANTI-
TRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1204, at 385 (Feb. 28, 1985). The author believes
that such a drastic step is unjustified.
260 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962).
261 Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984).
262 Id. at § 3.
